More of the continuing 5th Estate series on H5N1 weaponization by Yoshihiro Kawaoka and Teridah Ernala Ginting of Kobe University; attempted Indonesian H5N1 virus theft by Akiko Makino; coming soon: More "Smoking Gun" e-mails from Teridah Ernala to the 5th Estate
The 5th Estate
02/08/2011
The Avian Influenza H5N1 Virus in Indonesia
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Insane "novel" H5N1 virus creator Kawaoka... |
In January 2006, the National Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza Control Preparedness for Human Pandemic Influenza 2006-2008 was published.[8] It outlines the problems that the country faces, the goals, and the solutions in order to deal with controlling AI as well as preparing for a Human Pandemic. Shortly after, on 7 March 2006, the Indonesian National Committee for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (or Komnas FBPI) was created to coordinate the government’s responses to AI. The overall goal of the organization is to have the virus under control in Indonesia by the end of 2008. Komnas FBPI works closely with the Indonesian Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, as well as the Indonesian poultry industry and local and provincial governments.[9]
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...an uncanny resemblance to Unit 731's Shiro |
There are several problems that the government faces in order to effectively carry out those actions. The first problem is the “heavily decentralized system: policies made in Jakarta are often held up or in practice even blocked at the local level.”[12] This creates a disorganized atmosphere which hinders the ability of the government keep control of the situation. Also, there are not enough of these teams which makes it difficult to react effectively when there are simultaneous outbreaks thousands of kilometers apart.[13]
The second problem is the demographics of the country. There are many small villages that are tucked away in the vastness of the country, which makes it difficult for the quick reaction teams to reach, and as well to spread policies and education. There are approximately 30 million households—many of which are in those small villages—that are small scale farmers (backyard farmers) with their own supply of poultry for the family.[14] In these small villages farming is free-range, and there is little control over poultry.[15] All of these conditions combined create perfect conditions for the spread of AI, and makes it very difficult to control.
A third problem that the country faces is a lack of funding. Even though the country is receiving international aid, they are far from their budget set out in the National Strategy Plan. The Plan requires approximately $350m, and in 2006 international donors pledged $50m for 2007. Because the country faces other issues such as natural disasters and malaria, the government has been forced to cut spending to deal with AI. This in turn makes it harder for the country to gather donations from the international community when they themselves have cut their budget.[16] The lack of funding limits the amount of money it can spend on the quick response teams, as well as on vaccines and compensation for the poultry farmers.
Indonesia has received some flack by the international community in its dealing with the AI. Its response had been accused of being unorganized and underfinanced. It has also been accused of under-reporting cases and no longer keeping track of poultry cases.[17] Although these accusations might be accurate, the government is not entirely to blame due to some extenuating circumstances that were mentioned above. It is easier for the wealthier countries to criticize Indonesia when they have enough money and infrastructure to contain the problem. The mechanisms that were in place by the WHO to develop and produce vaccines against AI for poultry and humans in preparation for a pandemic were unfair to developing countries.[18] It left little choice for Indonesia, forcing it to take drastic measures: in January 2007, Indonesia stopped sending AI samples to the WHO and started bilateral arrangements between pharmaceutical companies.[19] This created a response, and by March 2007, the WHO revised its “terms of reference,” making the vaccines more accessible to developing countries and Indonesia agreed to start sending samples again.[20]
Even though Indonesia has taken flack for their response to AI, they have adopted some good polices in order to deal with the virus. The creation of Komnas FBPI and the drafting of the National Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza Control Preparedness for Human Pandemic Influenza 2006-2008 has facilitated coordination and communication between the different ministries in the government. The government should continue to focus their efforts in educating their population, and providing quick aid to those who are infected in order to contain the virus. The government should also continue to prioritize their resources to whatever crisis or problem is more threatening to their country, regardless of the input of the international community. If the rest of the world is afraid of the virus spreading to them, they should help out Indonesia.