Friday, December 23, 2011

An Unexpected Mortality Increase in the US Follows Arrival of Radioactive Plume from Fukushima

Japanese and U.S. lies and cover-up of real radiation exposure numbers will be exposed; responsible individuals will be hunted down, prosecuted (if civilian mobs don't get to them first) and executed for genocide

Global Research
By Dr. Joseph J Magano and Dr. Janette Sherman

The multiple nuclear meltdowns at the Fukushima plants beginning on March 11, 2011, are releasing large amounts of airborne radioactivity that has spread throughout Japan and to other nations; thus, studies of contamination and health hazards are merited. In the United States, Fukushima fallout arrived just six days after the earthquake, tsunami, and meltdowns. Some samples of radioactivity in precipitation, air, water, and milk, taken by the U.S. government, showed levels hundreds of times above normal; however, the small number of samples prohibits any credible analysis of temporal trends and spatial comparisons.

    U.S. health officials report weekly deaths by age in 122 cities, about 25 to 35 percent of the national total. Deaths rose 4.46 percent from 2010 to 2011 in the 14 weeks after the arrival of Japanese fallout, compared with a 2.34 percent increase in the prior 14 weeks. The number of infant deaths after Fukushima rose 1.80 percent, compared with a previous 8.37 percent decrease. Projecting these figures for the entire United States yields 13,983 total deaths and 822 infant deaths in excess of the expected.

   These preliminary data need to be followed up, especially in the light of similar preliminary U.S. mortality findings for the four months after Chernobyl fallout arrived in 1986, which approximated final figures. We recently reported on an unusual rise in infant deaths in the northwestern United States for the 10-week period following the arrival of the airborne radioactive plume from the meltdowns at the Fukushima plants in northern Japan. This result suggested that radiation from Japan may have harmed Americans, thus meriting more research.

Fukushima reactors continue to smoke, burn, release radiation
This result suggested that radiation from Japan may have harmed Americans, thus meriting more research. We noted in the report that the results were preliminary, and the importance of updating the analysis as more health status data become available (1). Shortly after the report was issued, officials from British Columbia, Canada, proximate to the northwestern United States, announced that 21 residents had died of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) in the first half of 2011, compared with 16 SIDS deaths in all of the prior year. Moreover, the number of deaths from SIDS rose from 1 to 10 in the months of March, April, May, and June 2011, after Fukushima fallout arrived, compared with the same period in 2010 (2).

    While officials could not offer any explanation for the abrupt increase, it coincides with our findings in the Pacific Northwest. Any comparison of potential effects of radiation exposure must attempt to examine the dose-response relationship of the exposure of a population. In the United States, the principal source of dose data (i.e., environmental radiation levels) is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

     Health data are the responsibility of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which provides weekly reports on mortality in 122 U.S. cities. These are preliminary data, but are the most useful at a date so soon after an event such as Fukushima. The goal of this report is to evaluate any potential changes in U.S. mortality resulting from exposure to the Fukushima plume, using EPA and CDC data.


    A quarter of a century before the Fukushima disasters, the meltdown at Chernobyl and the presence of environmental fallout presented a similar challenge for researchers to assess any adverse health effects. The discussion that began after the April 26, 1986, meltdown is still very much a current one, with varying estimates. A recent conference concluded that 9,000 persons worldwide survived with or died from cancer (3), while a compendium of more than 5,000 research papers put the excess death toll (from cancer and all other causes) at 985,000 (4). In the United States, Chernobyl fallout was detected in the environment just nine days after the meltdown. Gould and Sternglass (5) used EPA measurements of environmental radiation post-Chernobyl (6) and found elevated levels of radioactivity in air, water, and milk. For example, EPA data indicate that from May 13 to June 23, 1986, U.S. milk had 5.6 and 3.6 times more iodine-131 and cesium-137 than were recorded in May–June of 1985 (see Appendix Table 1, p. 60).

Japanese govenment statements on Fukushima, like U.S., all lies
In some cities, especially those in the harder-hit Pacific Northwest, average concentrations were as much as 28 times the norms, while some individual samples were much higher. Gould and Sternglass (5) also studied preliminary mortality data, to analyze any potential impact from fallout. Using a 10 percent sample of all U.S. death certificates, they found that during the four months after Chernobyl (May–August 1986), total deaths in the United States rose 6.0 percent over the similar period in 1985 (see Appendix Table 2) (7; estimated deaths based on a 10% sample of death certificates, minus the New England states, for which data were incomplete at the time).

    Eventually, final figures showed an increase of 2.3 percent, which exceeded the 0.2 percent decline in the first four months of the year (8). The number of excess deaths, or the difference between the actual and expected death totals, is 16,573.

    To date, the cause of this unusual pattern remains unknown, and no research testing hypotheses for causes other than Chernobyl has been published. This difference has a very high degree of statistical significance; there is a less than 1 in 109 probability that it occurred by random chance. The change in deaths for infants was also analyzed. Preliminary data showed an increase of 3.1 percent in U.S. infant deaths in the first four months after Chernobyl, 1985 versus 1986.

    The final increase was 0.1 percent, compared with a 2.3 percent decline in the four months before Chernobyl. The 1985–1986 differences in infant death rates were –2.9 percent (January–April) and +0.4 percent (May–August).

These gaps amounted to excess infant deaths of 306 and 424, and differences were significant at p < 0.08 and p < 0.055. The stillbirth, neonatal, and prenatal mortality increased in England and Wales within 11 months after Chernobyl’s initial release (9, 10), and in Germany (11). In two Ukrainian districts with increased levels of cesium-137 ground contamination, there was a significant increase in stillbirths (12).

    U.S. publications offered evidence that Americans may have suffered harm from Chernobyl, especially damage to fetuses and infants. Reports covered elevated levels of various radiation-related disorders, including newborn hypothyroidism (13), infant leukemia (14), and thyroid cancer among children (15). Gould and Sternglass (5) showed that trends using preliminary data were rough approximations of the final data. Because of the lengthy delay in generating final statistics—2011 data will probably not be published on the CDC website until 2014—we believe that analyzing preliminary health data at this time is a useful exercise that can approximate final mortality patterns and help guide future research on the effects of fallout from the Fukushima meltdowns.
...  [...]

Total Deaths

    During weeks 12 to 25, total deaths in 119 U.S. cities increased from 148,395 (2010) to 155,015 (2011), or 4.46 percent. This was nearly double the 2.34 percent rise in total deaths (142,006 to 145,324) in 104 cities for the prior 14 weeks, significant at p < 0.000001 (Table 2). This difference between actual and expected changes of +2.12 percentage points (+4.46% – 2.34%) translates to 3,286 “excess” deaths (155,015 × 0.0212) nationwide.

    Assuming a total of 2,450,000 U.S. deaths will occur in 2011 (47,115 per week), then 23.5 percent of deaths are reported (155,015/14 = 11,073, or 23.5% of 47,115).

    Dividing 3,286 by 23.5 percent yields a projected 13,983 excess U.S. deaths in weeks 12 to 25 of 2011.

    After March 19, 2011, total deaths were higher than a year earlier in 11 of the 14 weeks, with a 7.5 percent or greater increase in four of the weeks.

    The greatest rise occurred in weeks 12 to 20, with a 5.37 percent increase (96,900 to 102,108). In weeks 21 to 25, the increase was a considerably lower 2.74 percent (51,495 to 52,907).

    Whether this pattern will continue into the future or is temporary is not yet known.

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Wayne Madsen : Was CIA behind attempted assassination of powerful oversight senator?

The CIA is behind all that is corrupt and evil in the world

Wayne Madsen Report
By Wayne Madsen

Sailors aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS John Stennis may be surprised to know that the person for whom their ship is named, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John Stennis if Mississippi, ordered his committee to conduct a full review of the CIA's 1947 charter to prevent the agency from ever again engaging in secret wars, illegal surveillance as it did during Watergate, and political assassinations. Stennis apparently agreed with his Senate colleagues who believed that the 1947 National Security Act, which created the CIA, was too vague.

    Stennis was also spurred into action by the revelation of a memorandum from Secretary of State George C. Marshall to President Harry S Truman, dated February 7, 1947, that urged Truman to think again about signing the National Security Act because the CIA, created by the act, would have "almost unlimited powers" and that the agency's proposed powers needed clarification. Marshall was concerned that the proposed CIA would exercise peacetime powers that would diminish the role of the Department of State.

Senator John Stennis
Stennis was adamant about reviewing and possibly amending not only the 1947 National Security Act but also the 1949 CIA Act, which exempted the CIA from the limitations applied to other federal agencies in the expenditure of federal funds and permitted the CIA to keep its salaries, position titles, organization chart, and number of employees classified. Stennis and other senators also wanted access to National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), including the classified NSCID that created the CIA.

CIA director David Betrayus:  fruitcake, lost "war" in Afghanistan
Senator Stennis, confident that he had gotten the CIA's attention, was on his front lawn entering his 3609 Cumberland Street, Northwest Washington, DC, home at 7:40 pm on January 31, 1973, when he was approached by two men who demanded the 71-year old senator hand over his wallet, gold watch, and 25 cents in change. They then said, "Now we're going to shoot you any way." Stennis was struck by the first bullet, fired from a .22 caliber pistol, in his thigh and a second bullet hit his chest, close to his heart. The two assailants, reported to be black by the police, fled and were never apprehended. Stennis crawled to his front door and his wife called the police. The news media dutifully reported, without any evidence to the contrary, that the shooters likely did not realize they had shot Stennis.

    At first, doctors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center did not give much chance for Stennis surviving the double shooting but he miraculously pulled through. However, the momentum in bringing about a review of the CIA and its charter stalled in the Senate during Stennis's absence. Stennis's acting replacement, Stuart Symington of Missouri, was stonewalled by the CIA in getting access to classified NCSIDs.

CIA director and canoeing enthusiast  William Colby
There was an effort to derail the confirmation of William Colby as CIA director but that effort by liberal Democrats failed. Colby had been a veteran CIA clandestine services officer who met his own suspicious end in a canoeing "accident" on the Chespeake Bay on April 17, 1996. One of Colby's CIA colleagues, Miles Copeland Jr., said that Colby had not come clean with Congress on the true nature and purpose of the MK-ULTRA program, which included using mind-controlled political assassins.

Great Satan's "girlfriend"
Only 13 senators, all Democrats, voted against Colby's nomination as CIA director on August 1, 1973. They were Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, Alan Cranston of California, Harold Hughes of Iowa, Richard Clark of Iowa, Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, Joe Biden of Delaware, Frank Church of Idaho, Mike Gravel of Alaska, Philip Hart of Michigan, Floyd Haskell of Colorado, William Hathaway of Maine, George McGovern of South Dakota, and Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin.

    While in the hospital still recovering from his gunshot wounds, Stennis said, "The experience of the CIA in Laos, as well as in more recent disclosures of matters here at home, have caused me to definitely conclude that the entire CIA Act should be fully reviewed."

    Still recovering, Stennis missed the August vote on confirming Colby as CIA director. Arizona's Barry Goldwater also curiously missed the vote.


Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. Has some twenty years experience in security issues. As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. 

Wayne Madsen
 He has been a frequent political and national security commentator on Fox News and has also appeared on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. He has been invited to testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorism investigation panel of the French government. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National Press Club. Lives in Washington, D.C. 

STRATFOR : U.S. Security in Iraq After the Withdrawal

Obama, Clinton salivating over prospect of U.S. embassy Iraq being attacked so they may invade again

By Scott Stewart

The completion of the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq on Dec. 16 opens a new chapter in the relationship between the United States and Iraq. One of this chapter’s key features will be the efforts of the United States and its regional allies to limit Iranian influence inside Iraq during the post-Saddam, post-U.S. occupation era.

    From the 1970s until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf was balanced by Iraq’s powerful military. With Iraqi military might weakened in 1991 and shattered in 2003, the responsibility for countering Iranian power fell to the U.S. military. With that military now gone from Iraq, the task of countering Iranian power falls to diplomatic, foreign-aid and intelligence functions conducted by a host of U.S. agencies stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and consulates in Basra, Kirkuk and Arbil.

Car bombing, Baghdad
Following the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad became the largest embassy in the world. Ensuring the safety of as many as 11,000 people working out of the embassy and consulates in such a potentially hostile environment will pose a huge challenge to the U.S. State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the agency with primary responsibility for keeping diplomatic facilities and personnel secure. The CIA’s Office of Security (OS) will also play a substantial, though less obvious, role in keeping CIA case officers safe as they conduct their duties.

    Both the DSS and the OS are familiar with operating in hostile environments. They have done so for decades in places such as Beirut and, for the better part of a decade now, in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. However, they have never before had to protect such a large number of people in such a hostile environment without direct U.S. military assistance. The sheer scope of the security programs in Iraq will bring about not only operational challenges but also budgetary battles that may prove as deadly to U.S. personnel in Iraq as the militant threat.


    The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad sits on a 104-acre compound in Baghdad’s Green Zone. The size of the compound provides significant standoff distance from the perimeter to the interior buildings. The chancery itself, like the consulate buildings, was constructed in accordance with security specifications laid out by the U.S. State Department’s Standard Embassy Design program, standards first established by the Inman Commission in 1985 in the wake of the U.S. Embassy bombings in Beirut. This means that the building was constructed using a design intended to withstand a terrorist attack and to provide concentric rings of security. In addition to an advanced concrete structure and blast-resistant windows, such facilities also feature a substantial perimeter wall intended to protect the facility and to provide a standoff distance of at least 100 feet from any potential explosive device.  

(click here to enlarge image)
Standoff distance is a crucial factor in defending against large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) because such devices can cause catastrophic damage to even well-designed structures if they are allowed to get close before detonation. When combined, a heavy perimeter wall, sufficient standoff distance and advanced structural design have proved successful in withstanding even large VBIED attacks.

    Working inside the heavily fortified embassy and consulates in Iraq are some 16,000 personnel, 5,000 of whom are security contractors. The remaining 11,000 include diplomats, intelligence officers and analysts, defense attaches, military liaison personnel and aid and development personnel. There also are many contractors who perform support functions such as maintaining the facilities and vehicles and providing needed services such as cooking and cleaning.

The aftermath of a vegetable market blast in Baghdad
When considering the 5,000 security contractors, it is important to remember that there are two different classes of contractors who work under separate contracts (there are contracts for perimeter guards and personal security details in Baghdad as well as for security personnel at the consulates in Basra, Erbil and Kirkuk). The vast majority of security contractors are third-country nationals who are responsible for providing perimeter security for the embassy and consulates. The second, smaller group of contract security guards (from 500 to 700, many of whom are Americans) is responsible for providing personal security to diplomats, aid workers and other embassy or consulate personnel when they leave the compound. A parallel team of OS contract security officers, funded under the CIA’s budget, provides security for CIA officers when they leave the compound.

    In Iraq, a team of some 200 DSS special agents now oversees U.S. security operations (by contrast, a typical U.S. Embassy has two or three DSS special agents assigned to it). These agents are charged with implementing all the security programs at the embassy and consulates, from physical security and counterintelligence to cyber security, visa fraud and the investigation of crimes that occur on official premises. (With 16,000 full-time personnel assigned to these posts in Iraq, there are bound to be fights, thefts and sexual assaults.) DSS special agents also provide close oversight of the contract guard programs and directly supervise protective details during moves off the compound.

    U.S. embassies are designed to incorporate concentric rings of security. The outermost ring is provided by host-country security forces that are charged, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, with keeping foreign diplomats safe. Inside that ring is the local guard force, contract security guards who protect the outer perimeter of the facility. They also screen vehicles and pedestrians entering the compound.

Iraqi Shiites were targeted in bombings yesterday
The chancery itself is also designed to have concentric rings of security. Inside the outside walls of the building there is an additional ring of physical security measures called the “hardline,” which serves to protect the most sensitive areas of the embassy. The integrity of the hardline is protected by a security detachment of U.S. Marines, which in Baghdad is a company-sized element. Inside the hardline there is also an additional layer of physical security measures intended to provide a safe haven area, the final fallback defensive position for embassy personnel.

Threats and Challenges

    Because of the size and construction of the chancery and the consulate buildings, there is very little chance of an armed assault or IED attack succeeding against these facilities. While an indirect-fire attack using mortars or artillery rockets could get lucky and kill an American diplomat outside of the building, the biggest threat posed to American personnel is probably when they travel away from the compound. The large number of people assigned to these posts means there are many movements of personnel to and from the facilities (we’re hearing approximately 20 to 30 per day from the embassy alone).

Many of the bombings were indiscriminate
Baghdad’s Green Zone only has three exits, and there are multiple chokepoints such as bridges and security checkpoints throughout the city. These geographic constraints can be even more heavily exploited in planning an attack if a militant actor can also narrow the time factor by developing a source inside the embassy who can warn of an impending move. The time factor can also be narrowed if militants are allowed to operate freely by host-country security forces due to incompetence or collusion.

    Of course, the most dire physical threat to a hardened diplomatic facility is mob violence. If a large mob storms an embassy and the host-country security forces either cannot or refuse to act to stop it, there is no facility in the world that can withstand a prolonged assault by a determined crowd equipped with even primitive hand tools. The high-security doors on the exterior of a U.S. embassy and at the interior hardline can withstand an assault with a sledgehammer for 30 or 40 minutes, but the doors will eventually be defeated. Crowds armed with incendiary devices or explosives pose an even greater threat. During the November 1979 assault on the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, the mob that stormed the embassy compound lit a fire in the chancery that nearly burned the embassy staff alive as they hid in the building’s safe haven.

So the real key for security of American diplomatic facilities in Iraq, as in any country, is in the hands of the Iraqi government. Currently, there is a Brigade Combat Team from the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division on station in Kuwait, and a Marine Expeditionary Unit will likely be stationed in the region for the foreseeable future. However, if the security environment in Iraq degrades significantly, it might prove quite difficult to get those forces to a besieged diplomatic facility in time, even if the United States is able to maintain a secure area at the Baghdad International Airport it can use to fly troops into Baghdad and evacuees out. (Getting 16,000 personnel out of Baghdad is no small task, and the number needing to leave would likely be augmented by non-official Americans in country.)

    While much ado is being made in the news over the use of contract security guards in Iraq, it must be remembered that the DSS has used contract security guards to provide local guard services on the perimeter of almost every U.S. embassy and consulate in the world for decades. Even small embassies have dozens of contract guards who provide 24/7 perimeter security. In many cases, contract guards provide residential security for diplomats and their families. The DSS also has decades of experience operating in countries where the governments and populace are hostile to their security programs. The anti-contractor sentiment in Iraq in the wake of the 2009 Blackwater shooting incident is not unique, and U.S. embassies operate in many places where anti-American sentiment is quite high.

Iraqi chld burned during bombings
The concept of a diplomatic facility where diplomats cannot go off embassy grounds unless they have a security escort is also not new. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut has operated that way since the 1980s. In Beirut, DSS agents supervise these security details, but the security personnel manning the details are contractors. However, while such measures have long been in effect in Lebanon, the size of the U.S. Embassy there is quite small. In Iraq, such measures have been applied to a far larger number of people. The sheer scale of this security effort means that the budget to pay for it will have to be immense. The State Department has estimated that it will cost some $3.8 billion to get the system running the first year, and it is then projected to cost roughly $3.5 billion per year. And that number represents just the operating costs; it does not include pre-deployment training for personnel assigned to the mission and other important measures.

    Over the many years that the DSS has been overseeing guard contracts, the service has learned many lessons (some the hard way). One instructional incident was the September 2007 shooting of civilians in Nisoor Square in Baghdad by Blackwater contractors. Indeed, that incident spurred the DSS to mandate that a DSS agent be present to oversee every motorcade move. This is a big reason why there are now 200 DSS agents in Iraq. Since the DSS only has 2,000 agents to cover its global responsibilities, the mission in Iraq is placing a lot of strain on the organization.

Obama's legacy in Iraq
The presence of these agents on motorcades will undoubtedly assist the DSS in monitoring the performance of its contractors, but experience has shown that wherever there are guard contracts there will inevitably be instances of guard company managers attempting to pad profits by claiming compensation for services they did not render or skimping on services. Such problems tend to be relatively small in the case of, say, a 72-man local guard force in Guatemala, although it is not unusual to see a company lose its guard contract due to irregularities or incompetence. When you are talking about billions of dollars worth of guard contracts in Iraq covering thousands of security personnel, however, the potential for contract issues and the size of those issues is magnified. Because of this, the DSS, the State Department Inspector General and the Government Accounting Office will undoubtedly pay very close attention to ensure that contracts are properly fulfilled. The DSS, like many other government agencies, has been heavily criticized for its contract oversight in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past several years and has instituted new controls. Today the service is far better at overseeing such massive contracts than it was at the beginning of its operations in Iraq.

    With a total budget of only about $50 billion for the State Department and U.S. Agency of International Development, and with only $14 billion of that total going to fund operations worldwide, the billions earmarked for security in Iraq will certainly appear as a tempting pot of money for someone to raid — much like the funding provided to security programs in the 1980s following the recommendations of the Inman Commission.

    As STRATFOR has previously discussed, spending for diplomatic security often follows a discernable boom-and-bust cycle. During the boom, there is plenty of money to cover security expenses, but during the bust times, security programs often suffer death by a thousand cuts. Following the infusion of funding for diplomatic security programs in the 1980s, the 1990s saw a period of prolonged program cuts. Indeed, in the wake of the 1998 bombing attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, the Crowe Commission, tasked with investigating the matter, concluded in its final report that its members “were especially disturbed by the collective failure of the U.S. government over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the world.”

    As the United States moves further from 9/11 with no significant attacks taking place, and as a mood of fiscal austerity takes hold in Washington, it is likely that budgets for foreign affairs and diplomatic security will be cut and a new security bust cycle will occur. In the long term, budget cuts and unsustainable DSS staffing levels will dictate that diplomatic security programs in Iraq will have to be reduced. Such reductions will also require cuts in the overall size of the diplomatic mission in Iraq unless there is a dramatic change in the security environment.

This STRATFOR Intelligence Report republished with permission and thanks from The 5th Estate.



The real truth on 9/11 slowly continues to bleed out

Technical experts are mounting major challenges to official U.S. government accounts of how three World Trade Center skyscrapers collapsed in near-freefall after the 9/11 attacks 15 years ago.

Many researchers are focusing especially on the little-known collapse of



The Geopolitics Of The United States, Part 1: The Inevitable Empire

The Empire and the inevitable fall of the Obama criminal regime

STRATFOR Editor’s Note: This installment on the United States, presented in two parts, is the 16th in a series of STRATFOR monographs on the geopolitics of countries influential in world affairs.

Like nearly all of the peoples of North and South America, most Americans are not originally from the territory that became the United States.



Geopolitics Of The United States Part 2: American Identity And The Threats of Tomorrow

A look back at 2011 predictions for the future in order to put events of today into perspective

 photo capitalism_zpsah78uy5p.jpg
We have already discussed in the first part of this analysis how the American geography dooms whoever controls the territory to being a global power, but there are a number of other outcomes that shape what that power will be like. The first and most critical is the impact of that geography on the American mindset.



By Robert S. Finnegan

This e-mail outlines and confirms the acts of espionage against Indonesia and Indonesians by Akiko Makino and the others involved both in Kobe University and in AI Lab at University of Airlangga, Surabaya; Bahasa Indonesia original follows English translation...



UPDATED 01/07/2015 : New Analysis Challenges Tamiflu Efficacy; Hong Kong Corona Virus Outbreak


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Obama criminals now resulting to biowarfare in quest to destroy Chinese and ASEAN economy; "novel virus substrain" points directly to a Kawaoka / Fouchier / Ernala-Ginting Kobe lab virus weaponized and genetically altered to specifically target and infect the Asian population: Ribavirin...



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The 5th Estate has just purchased a library on H5N1 "Novel" virus pandemics, there are dozens of PDF and Exel documents we feel will assist you in saving lives following intentional releases of the H5N1 and now MERS viruses; we will begin by printing those that appear to be extremely relevant here: H5N1 Kobe-Kawaoka-Ernala series continues soon with more "Smoking Gun" e-mails from Teridah Ernala to The 5th Estate . . .



By Robert S. Finnegan

On October 12, 2002 the Indonesian island of Bali experienced a terrorist attack that rocked the world. It was unquestionably well-coordinated and executed, the largest in the country's history.