While new programs are often defined by their differences with past programs, there are usually striking similarities. Looking at past efforts is vital to adequately assess the prospects of and pitfalls facing the latest variant, the Afghan Local Police. This section provides a brief overview of some recent initiatives by the government and international forces to create and support irregular Afghan forces, often of a tribal or ethnic nature.
Over the past decade, militia forces in Afghanistan have ebbed and flowed in size, number, and degree of government support and resistance. There have been some efforts to disarm some militias and former warlords, though these have been half-hearted and undermined by allowing or supporting other militia and warlords to continue to operate. Meanwhile recurring local defense initiatives have re-empowered the same “commander networks.”
Following the collapse of the Taliban government in late 2001, many anti-Taliban militias were integrated into the Afghan Military Force (AMF) under the new Karzai government’s Ministry of Defense. It was these forces that were later the target of the first wave of demobilization under the internationally organized Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program.
The Afghan government and the US military launched the program in 2006, despite considerable skepticism from international advisors providing police training. A report from the Second International Police Conference on Afghanistan in October 2006 noted that:
As one senior official in the Ministry of Interior, Maj. Gen. Esmatullah Dawlatzai, told Human Rights Watch:
One Karzai ally who was asked to create a community defense force in Shah Wali Kot district of Kandahar province told Human Rights Watch:
The assassination campaign has included the targeting of police personnel, with the ALP appearing to be a prime target. A statement said to be from the Taliban was published in July 2010, condemning “local militias” and effectively declaring them legitimate targets:
US Embassy Cable (09KABUL3661 “Irregular Forces – What’s out there”), November 2009, Cable Released, January 24, 2011, http://wikileaks.enet.gr/cable/2009/11/09KABUL3661.html
See generally, Thomas Ruttig, “How tribal are the Taleban - Afghanistan’s largest insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 2010, p. 10, http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100624-TR-ExecSumHowTribalAretheTaleban.pdf;Ron Holt, “Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win,” September 2, 2009,
Small Wars Journal, p. 9, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/289-holt.pdf (accessed February 8, 2011); Mattieu Lefevre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan – A Review of Government Backed Initiatives,”
Afghan Analysts Network, May 2010, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=763.
Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan& Philip Wilkinson, “Minimal Investments, Minimal Results:The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” June 2004,
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, p. 16, http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/themes/docs/AREU-Brief-2004-June-security.pdf (accessed March 27, 2011). Antonio Guistozzi, “Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan” (London: Hurst, 2007), p. 166.
“Afghan, U.S. Officials Agree on New Force
,”
The Associated Press, March 5, 2004, http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/F5938F6D524312F987256E8900536A97?OpenDocument (accessed December 27, 2010).
“Afghan Militia Force Launched To Guard Border,”
RFERL, January 15 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1064717.html (accessed March 10, 2011). Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Kabul Raises Concerns With Plan To Use Militia Fighters As Police,”
RFERL, June 15, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1069190.html (accessed March 10, 2011).
Antonio Guistozzi,
Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 171-2.
Ann Scott Tyson “Military Weighs Recruiting Afghan Tribes to Fight Taliban,”
Washington Post, December 4, 2007,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/03/AR2007120301406.html (accessed March 10, 2011).
Statement by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown to the House of Commons: “Statement on Afghanistan,” December 12, 2007. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page14050 (accessed March 10, 2011).
Jon Boone, “US General warns on Afghan Defence Plan,”
The Financial Times, January 2, 2008. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f31af380-b95e-11dc-bb66-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1G88voviX (accessed March 10, 2011).
Numerous Human Rights Watch interviews with Afghan and international officials, Kabul, 2008-2011.
Human Rights Watch interview with Antonio Giustozzi, analyst, London February 2, 2011; Barbara Stapleton,
Disarming the Militias—DDR and DIAG and the Implications for Peace Building, 2010 (paper on file with Human Rights Watch).
Caroline A. Hartzell,
Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan, US Institute of Peace, April 2011, p. 5, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR270-Missed_Opportunities.pdf (accessed April 10, 2011).
International Crisis Group,
A Force in Fragments – Reconstituting the Afghan National Army, May 12, 2010, p. 6, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190-a-force-in-fragments-reconstituting-the-afghan-national-army.aspx.
Stapleton,
Disarming the Militias—DDR and DIAG and the Implications for Peace Building, 2010.
Human Rights Watch interview with Antonio Giustozzi, analyst, London February 2, 2011.
Barnett Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada, “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenge and the Future of State Building in Afghanistan,”
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 9-25; International Crisis Group,
Getting Disarmament Back on Track, February 2005.
Michael Bhatia, “The Future of Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Agreement
,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 102-03.
Stapleton,
Disarming the Militias—DDR and DIAG and the Implications for Peace Building, 2010 (paper on file with Human Rights Watch); Michael Bhatta,
The Future of Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Agreement, pp. 90-107. See generally also, Antonio Giustozzi,
Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan, in Donais, Timothy, (ed.) Local ownership and security sector reform. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 215-232 (2008).
Bhatia,
The Future of Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Agreement, pp. 102-03.National Democratic Institute (NDI):
The September Parliamentary and Provincial Elections in 2005 in Afghanistan, April 10, 2006, p. 6,http://www.ndi.org/files/2004_af_report_041006.pdf.
“Rights body warns of warlords’ success in elections,”
IRIN News, October 18, 2005. http://www.eariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/AFD2F0A9B9CD34138725709E0071173D?OpenDocument (accessed April 25, 2011).
Human Rights Watch interviews with a wide range of policy analysts, advisors, and government officials, Kabul, 2007-2011.
There are no reliable records of civilian casualties between 2001 and 2005. In 2006, Human Rights Watch estimated that a minimum of 929 civilians had been killed in the armed conflict that year. Human Rights Watch,
Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, September 8, 2008, p. 13, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75157/section/3.
Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPI),
Reforming the Afghan National Police, November 2009, p. 93, http://www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/afghanpolice/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf.
See Wilder,
Cops or Robbers – The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, pp. 13-17; International Crisis Group,
Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, pp. 13-14; Mathieu Lefevre,
Local Defense in Afghanistan: A Review of Government Backed Initiatives,” pp. 5-8; Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies,
Reforming the Afghan National Police, pp. 14, 102.
Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPI),
Reforming the Afghan National Police, November 2009,http://www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/afghanpolice/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf; Andrew Wilder, “Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police,”
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007, pp. 13-17; International Crisis Group,
Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, August 30, 2007,http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/138_reforming_afghanistan_s_police.ashx.
Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, p. 14. The ANAP was deployed in Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzghan, Ghazni, and Zabul.
Ibid., and Human Rights Watch interview with Tonita Murray, Kabul, October 29, 2010.
Human Rights Watch interview with Abdul Hadi Khalid, former Deputy Minister of Interior, Kabul, October 26, 2010.
Human Rights Watch interview with security sector advisor, Kabul, September 14, 2009. See also Mathieu Lefevre,
Local Defense in Afghanistan: A Review of Government Backed Initiatives, p. 6.
A Voice of America reporter quotes “American trainers” estimating that as many as one in ten ANAP could be “Taliban agents.” Benjamin Sand, “Afghan Government Recruiting Thousands of Auxiliary Police to Battle Insurgents,”
Voice of America, January 10, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/01/mil-070110-voa03.htm (accessed February 9, 2011).
Human Rights Watch interview with Abdul Hadi Khalid, Kabul, October 26, 2010. Graeme Smith, “Can new Afghan police resist temptation?,”
The Globe and Mail, November 8, 2006, http://web.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/74AC3637EFB93B508725722000414AF6?OpenDocument (accessed February 9, 2011).
Wilder,
Cop and Robbers, p. 15.
Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Gen. Esmatullah Dawlatzai, Kabul, October 26, 2010.
Human Rights Watch interview with Antonio Giustozzi, analyst, London, February 2, 2011.
David Axe, “NATO Cancels Afghan Cop Program,”
Wired, April 10, 2008. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/04/nato-cancels-af/ (accessed February 9, 2010).
Barbara Stapleton,
The role of DDR and DIAG and its impact on peace building, 2010 (paper on file with Human Rights Watch).
Human Rights Watch interviews with UN, EU, and Afghan election officials, Kabul, June, July, and August 2009. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Concerns in Run-Up to Elections,” News Release, August 17, 2009,http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/17/afghanistan-human-rights-concerns-run-elections.
The directorate was created by Presidential decree in April 2009. Thomas Ruttig, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’s Genies – (2) – A Look Forward,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 20, 2009, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=467 (accessed February 8, 2011).
Human Rights Watch interviews with analysts, Kabul, August 15 and 16, 2009. Arif Noorzai’s relatives include his cousin Haji Bashir Noorzai, who was found guilty of taking part in international narcotics smuggling at a trial in New York in September 2008. Benjamin Weiser, “Manhattan Jury Convicts Man Linked to Taliban Leader in Drug Smuggling Case,”
New York Times, September 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/nyregion/24noorzai.html?ref=hajibashirnoorzai, (accessed February 8, 2011). Arif Noorzai’s father, Haji Musa Jan Noorzai, was allegedly a key narcotics smuggler in the 1960s. Human Rights Watch interview with analyst, August 16, 2009; see also Jonathan Goodhand and David Mansfield, “Drugs and (Dis)order, A Study of the Opium Trade, Political Settlements and State-making in Afghanistan,” Crisis States Research Paper, p. 22, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/R4D/PDF/Outputs/CrisisStates/WP83.2.pdf.
Human Rights Watch interviews and email exchanges with senior UN and EU officials, Afghan and international analysts, Kabul, June-August 2009. For instance, militias were deployed in the northern province of Balkh, which had security challenges, but more importantly is the heartland of Mohammad Atta, one of the most powerful backers of the president’s rival in the election, Abdullah Abdullah. Human Rights Watch interview with analyst, London, April 22, 2011.
Human Rights Watch interview officials involved in election management and monitoring, Kabul, August 2009.
Human Rights Watch interview with electoral official, Kabul, August 13, 2009.
Human Rights Watch interview with senior international official (who had been present at the meeting), Kabul, August 16, 2009.
Human Rights Watch interview with elder, Kabul, October 6, 2010.
There were reports of what may have been community defense forces in Faryab, Uruzgan, and several other provinces, though the presence of armed groups at polling stations was a common feature in many parts of the country during elections in 2004, 2005, 2009, and 2010. Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with regional election monitors and political officials, in Faryab, Khost, Ghazni, Uruzgan, August 2009. Thomas Ruttig, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’s Genies – (2) – A Look Forward,” Afghanistan Analysts Network
, November 20, 2009, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=467 (accessed February 8, 2011).
One international official present in security meetings discussing the force said that the Ministry of Interior had provided US$1.5 million for the force. Human Rights Watch interview with senior international official present at the meeting, Kabul, August 16, 2009.
Human Rights Watch interviews in Kabul, 2009-2010.
Human Rights Watch interview with international official, Kabul, July 14, 2010.
US Department of Defense Progress reports to Congress separately cite CDI and LDI as beginning in July 2009. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan - Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended,” p. 68, November 2010, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf (accessed February 9, 2011) (“DoD Afghanistan Progress Report 2010”); CFSOCC-A, “If You’ve Seen One VSP, You’ve Seen One VSP”: Understanding Best Practices in Village Stability Operations, September 2010 (on file with Human Rights Watch) (“Understanding Best Practices in VSOs”).
Jim Michaels, “Security plan looks to Afghan villages in fight against Taliban,”
USA Today, December 12, 2009. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-11-11-afghan-tribes_N.htm (accessed February 8, 2011).
CFSOCC-A, Understanding Best Practices in VSOs, p. 6.
DoD 1230 Afghanistan Progress Report November 2010, p. 68. According to the Department of Defense, the VSO initiative follows four phases: shape, hold, build, and transition. The shape phase begins with an assessment of the village and establishment of SOF VSO site in the village where SOF build relationships with elders in the village. During the hold phase, VSO personnel focus on protecting the population and lay foundation for governance and development efforts. The build phase links villages to district and provincial governments through shuras and development project using Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2011, p. 63 (“DoD 1230 Afghanistan Progress Report April 2011”), http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf (accessed May 2, 2011).
CFSOCC-A, Understanding Best Practices in VSOs, p. 8.
DoD 1230 Afghanistan Progress Report November 2010, p. 68; CFSOCC-A, Understanding Best Practices in VSOs, p. 8.
Human Rights Watch interview with Ministry of Interior official, Kabul, May 12, 2010. Extract from US Embassy Cable 09KABUL3661, released by by Wikileaks, “Irregular Forces – What’s out there,” Cable date, November 12, 2009, Cable Released, January 24, 2011, http://wikileaks.enet.gr/cable/2009/11/09KABUL3661.html; Alissa Rubin and Richard A. Oppel, “U.S. and Afghanistan Debate More Village Forces,”
New York Times, July 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/world/asia/13afghan.html?_r=2&ref=world (accessed May 17, 2011).
Human Rights Watch interview with US military official, Kabul, February 12, 2010. US officials at one time considered working with Arif Noorzai’s directorate (see CDF, above).
Claire Truscott, “Fears Surface Over US-Trained Local Afghan Forces,”
Agence France Press, June 19, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jXFWpO8H460cjiUBzVrFSjWUniGg?docId=CNG.69ead26989f7f2ebf65544104f3b136c.201 (accessed June 19, 2011).
Jon Boone, “Afghans Fear Return of the Warlords as Anti-Taliban Militias Clash,”
The Guardian, February 16, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/16/afghans-fear-return-of-warlords,(accessed June 22, 2011).
Claire Truscott, “Fears Surface Over US-Trained Local Afghan Forces,”
Agence France Press, June 19, 2011.
Under international humanitarian law, police normally have the status of civilians. However, police units that take part in military operations or otherwise engage in military functions may be targeted as combatants. Individual police may only be targeted during such time that they take a direct part in the hostilities. While Human Rights Watch recognizes that there has been some blurring of the boundaries of police and military functions during counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, there remains a duty on combatants to distinguish civilians from military targets. For a comprehensive legal analysis see Human Rights Watch,
The Human Cost: The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan,” Section VI, p. 84 (April 2007).
“2010 Claims Lives of 1292 Afghan Police,”
Tolo News, January 2, 2011, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/1489-2010-claims-lives-of-1292-afghan-police (accessed March 22, 2011).
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, MidYear Report 2011 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, July 2011, p. 2, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/2011%20Midyear%20POC.pdf (accessed July 25, 2011).
Solomon Moore, “Taliban Assassination Campaign Impedes Governance,”
Associated Press, March 22, 2011,http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110322/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan_assassinations (accessed March 22, 2011).
“Statement of the Islamic Emirate regarding the US setup of new "Local Militia," published on
Al Qimmah Media, described as an “Islamic network,” http://www.alqimmah.net/archive/index.php/t-19026.html (accessed March 22, 2011).
Mohammad Hamed, “Suicide bomber kills 30 as Afghan violence spreads,”
Reuters, February 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/21/us-afghanistan-bomb-idUSTRE71K19220110221 (accessed April 6, 2011).
Jonathan Boone, “Taliban bomber kills 30 civilians at Afghan militia meeting - Suicide attack thought to be aimed at US-backed informal police force kills locals queuing outside,”
The Guardian, February 19, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/taliban-bomber-kills-30-civilians (accessed March 22, 2011).
Human Rights Watch interview with government official, Kabul, February 28, 2011.
Human Rights Watch group interview with villagers from Masiyan village, Herat, February 23, 2011.
ANSO Bi-Weekly Report, Issue No. 28, February 16-28, 2011, http://www.afgnso.org/2011/The%20ANSO%20Report%20(16-28%20February%202011)%20(Read-Only).pdf (accessed March 10, 2011).
Human Rights Watch interview with village elder, Kabul, February 18, 2011.