09/25/2011
As the threat by insurgent forces in the north increased in 2009, the NDS and other authorities, such as governors, began reactivating some of the militia networks that were powerful during the anti-Soviet resistance and civil war in a number of provinces, including Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar.[79] This re-armament was most strongly associated with Tajiks, and with the Jamiat-i-Islami networks. The NDS still has links with former Shura-e Nazar (“Supervisory Council,” formerly led by Ahmed Shah Massoud) networks and has primarily reactivated militias from these groups.
Clearly this partisan development could be potentially destabilizing (and may be connected to the revival of a number of Junbish militia in ethnic Uzbek areas during the same time period).[80] But the most problematic aspect of the rearmament by the NDS was that it involved providing military weaponry and funds without sufficient oversight, command, or control.[81] For example, a US State Department cable released by Wikileaks stated that, “[W]arlord Mir Alam Khan's Kunduz militia … is reportedly connected to the National Directorate of Security (NDS) but seems to operate without government guidance, command or control.”[82]
When one community sees a rival community rearm, they may also turn to a rival network for assistance. For example, in January 2011, a group of around 100 elders from Kunduz visited Vice President Mohammad Qasim Fahim in Kabul to raise concerns about security. Fahim reportedly told them that he had instructed the former NDS head, Amrullah Saleh, and a regional strongman, Mir Alam (see below), to provide weapons to militias in order to “prevent a Taliban takeover.”[84] In this environment it becomes harder to distinguish whether increasing levels in violence are a product of heightened insurgent activity, additional international forces, or government-backed militia, or turf wars between irregular armed groups.
The Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO) has charted the rise in activity by irregular armed groups in the northeast.
Militias in Kunduz
Kunduz province is ethnically diverse, with a mixture of ethnic Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, Arab, Baluch, Hazara and Turkmen communities.[85] The two most significant ethnicities are the Tajiks and Uzbeks, with two political parties, Jamiat-i Islami, primarily associated with Tajiks, and the predominantly Uzbek party, Junbish-i Mili, wielding considerable influence. Among Pashtuns, both Ittihad-i-Islami and Hezb-i-Islami have influence.
Kunduz was the focus of the most sustained insurgent campaign in the northeast in 2010, with the Taliban making inroads into every district of the province.[86] Insurgent forces conducted an assassination campaign against government officials. On October 8, 2010, the governor of Kunduz, Muhammad Omar, was killed when the mosque he was attending in neighboring Takhar province was bombed. No claim of responsibility was made.[87] The police chief of Kunduz, Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili, was killed on March 10, 2011, in a suicide attack claimed by the Taliban.[88] On May 28, 2011, the police commander of the northern region, Gen. Daud Daud, was killed in a suicide bomb attack. Daud was a well known national figure, and one of the most senior government officials to have been killed by the Taliban. The blast, in the governor’s compound in Takhar province, also killed three other Afghan officials and two German soldiers.[89] Daud was a prominent Northern Alliance commander during the 1990s.
Alam is described in US embassy cables released by WikiLeaks as a “destabilizing” influence, closely connected to narcotics smuggling and armed groups:
The situation in Baghlan started to deteriorate after the June 2005 appointment of General Mir Alam as Provincial Chief of Police. Mir Alam is a Tajik, former Jihadi and former commander of 54th Division, affiliated to HNA [Hezbi-Naween Afghanistan] and still linked to various armed groups.[94]
Another US embassy cable concludes:
Mir Alam’s Kunduz militia—ethnically divisive, controlled by one man, grounded in contempt for DIAG [disarmament] and the rule of law—exemplifies a quick fix with dangerous implications: tactical gains at strategic cost.[95]
While government backing for militias seems to be primarily of former Jamiat networks, there has also been a resurgence of militias associated with non-Tajik ethnic groups.[96]
A resident of Kunduz told Human Rights Watch: “The government officials, the arbakis, they are all from same club, and they have drunk the blood of Afghan people for the past 30 years.”[98]
On August 1, 2011, the government issued an order for members of local militias in Khanabad district to surrender their weapons or face a military crackdown. Ten days after the order, 13 heavy weapons, such as rockets and missiles, had been surrendered.[99] Residents in Khandabad district expressed concern that the militias have been looting property, forcibly collecting taxes, and would not voluntarily surrender their weapons.[100] According to the district chief of police in Khanabad, some militia members who “have helped the government for the past two years and not committed crimes” will be allowed to join the Afghan Local Police.[101]
Khanabad district lies to the east of Kunduz province, bordering Takhar. While the Taliban increased its infiltration into the area in 2009-10, it has less insurgent activity than many other parts of the province. The district is ethnically diverse, with a complex web of power and a myriad of small militias.[102] Fakir Mohammed, a local farmer, told Human Rights Watch that the area is lawless:
The police are very weak, they can’t do anything there. It’s mainly the local strongmen and warlords, they control everything there; the district police, the district security bosses. If they want to do anything they can.[103]
The district governor, Nesamudin Nasher, says that there are hundreds of arbakis in Khandabad district:
People come to me and complain about these arbakis, but I can do nothing about this. They collect ushr [informal tax], take the daughters of the people, they do things against the wives of the people, they take their horses, sheep, anything.[104]
A cable from US embassy staff in the north, released by Wikileaks, quotes an NDS official noting that Khanabad militias are particularly out of control, where “some groupings were cooperating with both insurgents and GIRoA [the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], changing their behavior opportunistically depending on their own interests.”[105]
The cases below are examples of militia-related abuses in Khanabad district.
Killings to Intimidate
“Commander” Nawid heads a militia with approximately 20 men in the town of Khanabad. His militia has been accused of several killings, widespread theft, and intimidation. According to local residents and government officials, Nawid has powerful connections to former police chief Mir Alam.[106]
In his three years as governor of the district, Nesahudin Nasher says that Nawid’s group has been responsible for most of the abuses: “There is a group led by person called Nawid, he’s doing everything. During my term he’s killed five people. His men are also robbing and stealing and taking money.”[107]
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Agha Padar says that he believes his brother was killed because he had been refusing the demands of Nawid and his men to join them. When he refused to join the militia, “They were putting pressure on my brother. They said that because he had a good salary, he should buy them machineguns and rockets.”[110]
Padar, who is a farmer, says that Nawid’s men also tried to take money from him and other local people: “It’s not just me that they steal from, they take money from shoemakers, from tailors, from everyone.”[111]
Nawid is reportedly backed by Mir Alam. District Governor Nasher said Alam intervened to prevent Nawid’s arrest:
A few months ago Nawid killed the brother of Agha Padar, who came and complained to me. I ordered the chief of police to arrest him [Nawid]. But when he tried to arrest him, Mir Alam called him to stop him. So I went to see the governor and asked him, “Who is district governor, me or Mir Alam?”[112]
Agha Padar also blames Alam for the failure to arrest Nawid. Padar says that because of his attempts to ensure that the perpetrators are prosecuted, he has come under attack:
Right after the murder of my brother, when the government didn’t do anything, he [Nawid] started this. Almost every night he came with his men, firing 50 rounds of bullets. It’s harassment to send me away from the area, to show that he has won…. They are more confident now.[113]
The threats against the family of Agha Padar have continued, but Human Rights Watch is not aware of any action by authorities in the case.[114] Agha Padar requested assistance from the local NDS office in Khanabad district and was told that they would soon have a solution. When Human Rights Watch asked the local NDS chief, General Nemat, what this solution might be, he said that he hoped to soon bring these militias under the control of the Afghan Local Police. He said it would be up to the community to decide whether Nawid would be included in the ALP, but that Ministry of Interior guidelines were clear about people who have questionable backgrounds.[115]
Killing in Khanabad Bazaar
On August 22, 2009, four men were killed and another wounded by Nawid’s militia.[116] Ahmadullah and his cousin Naimatullah, who were both around 20 years old, were at a barber shop in Khanabad city. According to Ahmadullah’s father, Munir Noor Alam, a group of six armed men arrived at the barber shop.
According to a family member interviewed by Human Rights Watch, three men, Nawid, Pervez, and Hasibullah, went into the barber shop and opened fire, while the three others stood guard.[117] Niamatullah and Ahmatullah were killed, as was a shopkeeper, Kamaluddin, son of Serajuddin. One of Nawid’s men, Hasibullah, was killed, allegedly in error, and a bystander, Abdul Haq, was wounded.
There were many witnesses to the killings. One resident, Fakir Mohammad, told Human Rights Watch:
This happened in the day in Khanabad bazaar, 500 meters from the office of the police chief. The police didn’t bother to go and see what happened, but there was loud gunfire. Everyone saw. Everyone knew the killers.[118]
Munir Noor Alam told Human Rights Watch that he believes a family with whom he had a longstanding dispute had hired a local militia to carry out the killings.
Khanabad District Governor Nasher told Human Rights Watch, “There was no reason for these killings, no reason.” He said that his request to the local security authorities to arrest those responsible was ignored.[121]
When interviewed in January 2011, the NDS chief in Khanabad, General Nemat, confirmed that Nawid had not been arrested because of his close relations with the provincial police chief, Abdul Rahman Sayyedkhili. He said that Nawid and his 20-30 men had been used in operations against the Taliban in Char Dara district in 2010. Nawid was called the “Char Dara conqueror” by the chief of police.[122] Sayyedkhili was killed in March 2011.
When Human Rights Watch raised concerns about the militia abuses in an interview with Mir Alam, he said he had no involvement with militias:
Whoever says that I have arbakis and supporting them is completely wrong. I am not denying that I was not a jihadi commander, but all people under my command have been disarmed through the DDR and DAIG process.[123]
The introduction of the Afghan Local Police in Kunduz was particularly sensitive because of concerns among some government and international military officials about the strength of Shura-e Nazar in the security forces that might undermine efforts to balance the program.[124]
A number of powerful militias operate in the district, most of whom are assumed to be connected to the Ibrahimis.[130] They operate with impunity, as the case below illustrates.
On January 24, 2010, the local mullah, Rahmatullah, along with sub-commander Zulmai (a relative of Commander Sarbaz who controls militias in several villages), and three other armed men, went to the home of two sisters-in-law in the village of Baika. The men gang raped the two women at gunpoint, having tied up their husbands.[131] Habibullah S. [pseudonym], husband of one of the women, told Human Rights Watch:
There were five people, all armed. They came to my house and they tied my hands and my brother’s hands. Then they raped my wife and my brother’s wife. I was with my brother, but we had no firearms. So we could not do anything. If I had been armed I could have fought them, I could have fought them to the end of my life. They would have killed me but it would have been worth it.[132]
Habibullah S. said their wives had been harassed by Rahmatullah in the weeks before the gang rapes. He explained:
The mullah was behind it. Before this three times the mullah came to my house, with bad intentions, to do something to our wives. Our wives said, “We don’t want any men here, why are you coming?” After the last time, my wife went to the mosque, took hold of his clothes with other people there, and told him not to come again. After that he became so angry with us that he sent these men to us.[133]
A local human rights investigator confirmed the account. He told Human Rights Watch that the mullah had reportedly told the man and his brother that they should “control their wives.”[134]
On January 25, 2010, the authorities arrested Rahmatullah and charged him only with illegal entry.[135] He was found guilty by a primary court on March 10, 2010, and sentenced to six months, of which he served three.[136]
The other four assailants were never arrested. Habibullah S., says that they are untouchable:
They have powerful connections, that’s why they are still walking freely in the district.... They are part of the arbaki. There are lots of arbakis in the villages, and they are all thieves. They are involved in robbery, in stealing, sometimes they take money from your pocket, and say if you complain I will kill you…. There are no laws, no rules. They have weapons, they can kill people, they can go into houses and do anything to you.[137]
Kunduz District
Numerous militias operate in Kunduz district, many with NDS support. One elder, Commander Gul Afghan, explained the genesis of NDS involvement:
The entire district was under the control of a Taliban commander Mawlawi Zahir. The head of the NDS [Gen. Daud Ibrahimi] said you have to ask him [Zahir] to leave. We said okay but you need to provide security for us, otherwise the Taliban gives us security. The NDS chief said, I promise. After that we, the elders, we appointed 10 people in every district, they were armed. Then we asked Mawlawi Zahir to leave. He knew that although he had 200 armed men, he knew that the community didn’t support him, so he left.[138]
Akbar expressed frustration with Mir Alam’s strength and reach:
Around me Mir Alam’s people are powerful. There’s also a small group established by the NDS and the governor, but they are small compared to Mir Alam. Even the chief of police can’t do anything against them.
Haji Akbar along with others from several districts raised the harassment of taxi drivers by the militia:
One of the biggest problems is for taxi drivers when they take people from the city to the village. [The militia] tell the drivers to leave their passengers here and take them [the militia] to another village. When they refuse, they are beaten.[142]
The practice of militias demanding ushr was common in the 1990s when the powerful warlords and mujahideen commanders ruled pockets of the country in a semi-feudalistic manner. Militia commanders have often attempted to present themselves as protectors of the community, thus deserving this compensation. Interviews carried out by Human Rights Watch suggest that communities often see this practice by militias as criminal, enriching the militia and their patron or commander. Haji Akbar said:
Taking one tenth of the people’s incomes is a religious thing, it goes to the poor people. We know who the poor people in our community are. We could help them with this. But they [arbakis] collect one tenth for themselves, not the poor, and they take extra that they say is for being soldiers. But they are bad people.[143]
Commander Gul Afghan, who initially welcomed NDS support, told Human Rights Watch that he was so frustrated with extortion by arbakis that he wanted to set up his own defense force to protect the community from them, rather than the Taliban:
I went one week ago to appoint a community commander from two villages to control 50 villages [with arbakis]. We are firm in our decision. If the arbakis disturb us again, it is my personal order to resist, to fire on the arbakis.[144]
Militias and Sexual Predation
Rape as a weapon of war has been strongly associated with militias, particularly during the civil war in the 1990s.[145] Militias have continued to be implicated in sexual violence, particularly gang rape. They have also have used threats to forcibly obtain women and girls, which can be hard for powerless families to resist. An elder told Human Rights Watch:
The most powerful ones will sometimes select a girl and tell the family that they want to marry her. For families there are only two choices: give the girl, or leave the area and go to Pakistan or Iran.[146]
In 2011, a 12-year-old girl was raped in her home by men wearing Afghan army uniforms in Qulbars area, near the capital Taluqan, Takhar province. According to a local government official, who wished to remain anonymous, residents in Taluqan believe that “arbakis” dressed in uniforms were involved in the incident.[147] At this writing, no arrests have been made.[148]
There is a separate but related type of abuse known as bachabazi (literally, “boy play”). Bachabazi involves wealthy or powerful “commanders” keeping boys to be dressed up as girls and to dance, which may often entail sexual abuse.[151] This practice is most prevalent in the north, where it is strongly associated with militias and the state security forces.[152]
Haji Akbar from Kunduz said:
Almost everyone creates this problem for boys…. Out of 100, 80 percent of them are doing bachabazi, maybe 20 percent don’t. Because the commanders do this, the rest do it.[153]
Commander Mohammad Gul Aghan, also from Kunduz district, said:
Sometimes it [bachabazi] is voluntary, sometimes not. Sometimes they give money to the family or to the boy, and they give clothing or weapons. Today it’s not as big as in the past, in the jihad time. Now it is only half of the bad people who are doing this.[154]
[79] Human Rights Watch interview with UN official, Kabul, August 19, 2009, Human Rights Watch interview with Nic Lee, director, Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, Kabul, September 28, 2010, and with local journalist, Kunduz, October 19, 2010.
[80] The influence of Junbish has waned in recent years, and overt links with senior government officials are less clear. Human Rights Watch interview with Antonio Giustozzi, researcher and author, London, February 1, 2011. Individual Uzbek commanders in Kunduz and Takhar have reactivated militias to fight recent Taliban infiltration. The degree of government support is unclear. Human Rights Watch interview with Cristoph Reuter, journalist and writer, Kabul, September 22, 2010.
[81] Human Rights Watch interviews with security analyst, Kabul, February 15, 2011.
[82] Extract from a US Embassy cable 09 KABUL3661, released by Wikileaks, Extract from: “Unconventional Security Forces – What’s Out There?” Cable Date: November 12, 2009. Released by Wikileaks, January 24, 2011, http://wikileaks.enet.gr/cable/2009/11/09KABUL3661.html (accessed March 24, 2011).
[83]For instance, observers suggest that amilitia of a Turkmen commander called NabiGichi operating in Qala-e Zal district in the north of the province was responsible for holding back Taliban incursions, generating popular support among some fellow Turkmens.
[84]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with local journalist, February 23, 2011.
[85] Kunduz is predominantly a Tajik/Uzbek dominated province, but significant “Pashtunization” took place as a deliberate government policy in several waves from the 1920s. See Conrad Schetter, Rainer Glassner, and Masood Karokhai, “Beyond Warlordism – the Local Security Architecture in Afghanistan,’ InternationalePolitik und Gesellschaft, September 2007, p. 144, http://www.fes.de/IPG/inhalt_d/pdf/10_Schetter_US.pdf (accessed December 24, 2010). Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, “The Northern Front – The Afghan Insurgency Spreading Beyond the Pashtuns,” May 2010, Afghan Analysts Network, p. 2, http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/20100629AGCR-TheNorthernFront1.pdf (accessed January 6, 2011).
[86] Char Dara, Dasht-i-Archi, and Imam Sahib. Human Rights Watch interview with local journalist, Kunduz, October 19, 2010, and with local government official, Kunduz, October 21, 2010. In early 2011, there were signs that some government control had been restored in several districts. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with local journalist, Kunduz, February 23, 2011.
[87]“Head of Afghanistan’s Kunduz province killed in bombing,” BBC News, October 8, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11499588 (accessed December 23, 2010).
[88] “Afghan suicide blast kills Kunduz police chief,” BBC News, March 10, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12706081 (accessed April 24, 2011). “Taliban claim killing of Afghan police chief,” Daily Times online, March 12, 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C03%5C12%5Cstory_12-3-2011_pg14_3 (accessed April 24, 2011).
[89] Ben Farmer, “General Daud Daud and at least two German soldiers killed by suicide bomb,” The Telegraph, May 28, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8543955/General-Daud-Daud-and-at-least-two-German-soldiers-killed-by-suicide-bomb.html (accessed May 30, 2011).
[90] Susanne Koelbl, “'Every Man for Himself' - Afghan Militias Take on Taliban,” Der Speigel, February 3, 2010 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,680965-2,99.html (accessed December 24, 2010).
[91] Human Rights Watch interviews with several residents of Khanabad district, Kunduz, October 20-21, 2010, and with the district governor, Nesamudin Nasher, Kunduz, October 22, 2010.
[92] Alam relinquished some weapons in June 2005,when he was appointed police chief of Baghlan province. Human Rights Watch interview with human rights official, Kunduz, October 20, 2010. See also, “Three former Jihadi Commanders Surrender Arms,” Pajhwok Afghan News, June 25, 2005, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2005/06/25/three-former-jihadi-commanders-surrender-arms (accessed January 6, 2011).
[93] Koelbl, “'Every Man for Himself' - Afghan Militias Take on Taliban,” Der Speigel, February 3, 2010., Human Rights Watch interview with international official, Kabul, February 24, 2011, and regional journalist, Kunduz, October 19, 2010.
[94] Extract from “Kunduz Politics Of Corruption In The Baghlan Police Forces,” US Embassy Cable, Reference 05KABUL5181, Dated December 20, 2005, released by Wikileaks, January 27, 2011, http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05KABUL5181 (accessed February 2, 2011).
[95] Extract from US Embassy Cable 09KABUL3661, released by Wikileaks: “Unconventional Forces – What’s out there,” Cable date, November 12, 2009, Cable Released, January 24, 2011. http://wikileaks.enet.gr/cable/2009/11/09KABUL3661.html (accessed March 24, 2011).
[96] Human Rights Watch interview with Nic Lee, director, Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, Kabul, September 28, 2010, and Human Rights Watch interview with human rights official, Kunduz, October 20, 2010.
[97] Human Rights Watch interview with government official, Kunduz, October 2010.
[98] Human Rights Watch interview with Fakir Mohammad, Kunduz, October 20, 2010.
[99]Human Rights Watch interview with District Chief of Police, Khanabad district, August 9, 2011.
[100]Human Rights Watch interviews with three residents who wished to remain anonymous, Khanabad district, August 9, 2011.
[101]Human Rights Watch interview with Sufi Habib, District Chief of Police, Khanabad district, August 9, 2011.
[102] The district governor of Khanabad, Nesamudin Nasher, told Human Rights Watch that there are 700-800 militia membersin Khanabad district. Human Rights Watch could not independently confirm this figure. Human Rights Watch interview with Nesamudin Nasher, District Governor of Khanabad, Kunduz, October 22, 2010.
[103]Human Rights Watch interview with Fakir Mohammad, Kunduz, October 20, 2010.
[104]Human Rights Watch interview with Nesamudin Nasher, District Governor of Khanabad, Kunduz, October 22, 2010.Ushr in Islam is a form of zakat (charity giving obligatory on Muslims), generally on agricultural produce.
[105] US Embassy cable “Militias in Kunduz: A tale of two districts,” released by Wikileaks.Document ID: 10KABUL12. Document date: January 3, 2010. Release date, January 24, 2011, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/01/10KABUL12.html (accessed April 24, 2011).
[106] Human Rights Watch interviews with Kunduz residents, and a local journalist, Kunduz, February 23, 2010.
[107]Human Rights Watch interview with Nesamudin Nasher, District Governor of Khanabad, Kunduz, October 22, 2010.
[108]Human Rights Watch interview with Agha Padar, brother of Mirwais, Kunduz city, October 21, 2010.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112]Human Rights Watch interview with Nesamudin Nasher, District Governor of Khanabad, Kunduz, October 22, 2010.
[113]Human Rights Watch interview with Agha Padar, brother of Mirwais, Kunduz city, October 21, 2010.
[114]Ibid.
[115] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with General Nemat, Khanabad district NDS chief, January 23, 2011, and April 25, 2011.
[116] Human Rights Watch interview with Munir Noor Alam, Kunduz, October 21, 2010, and Nesamudin Nasher, District Governor of Khanabad, Kunduz, October 22, 2010.
[117] Those who stood guard were named by Munirnoor Alam as Nasi, son of Karim, Mir Agha, son of Haji Yasouf, and Lange Yamar. Human Rights Watch interview with Munir Noor Alam, Kunduz, October 21, 2010.
[118]Human Rights Watch interview with Fakir Mohammad, Kunduz, October 20, 2010.
[119] Human Rights Watch interview with Munir Noor Alam, Kunduz, October 21, 2010.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Human Rights Watch interview with Nesamudin Nasher, District Governor of Khanabad, Kunduz, October 22, 2010.
[122] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with General Nemat, Khanabad district NDS chief, January 23, 2011.
[123] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mir Alam, March 31, 2011.
[124]Human Rights Watch interview with international officials, Kabul, February 22, 2011. (It was noteworthy that both the president and the minister of interior paid visits to the province in January and February 2011, to make promises about bringing militias under control. Human Rights Watch interview with local journalist, February 23, 2011).
[125]Human Rights Watch interview with international officials, Kabul, February 22, 2011.